Refutation systems are formal systems for inferring the falsity of formulae. These systems can, in particular, be used to syntactically characterise logics. In this paper, we explore the close connection between refutation systems and admissible rules.
According to Łukasiewicz (1951) , we assert true propositions, and reject false ones. He remarked that rejection had been neglected in the study of formal logic, and introduced a formal system to inductively derive rejections of false propositions. We call such systems refutation systems, following Scott (1957) and Skura (1990) . The general theory of such systems has been studied extensively by Wybraniec-Skardowska (1971, 1972) . In this paper, we focus on refutation systems for intermediate logics.
A refutation system can be thought of as a proof system for rejection. Instead of deriving that one can correctly assert a statement through a series of truth-preserving inferences from given axioms, as one does in a proof system of assertion, one derives the refutability of a propositional statement through a series of non-truth preserving inferences from given anti-axioms. Proofs in a refutation system will be called refutations, and a formula will be called refutable whenever a refutation exists ending in this formula.
Let us, by way of example, present a reformulation of the original refutation system for the classical propositional calculus (CPC) as given by Łukasiewicz (1951) . This particular presentation, and all the following, will be in the style of Skura (1992) , which goes back to Scott (1957 The admissible rules of a logic can be thought of as those rules under which the set of its theorems is closed. Such rules were covered explicitly by Lorenzen (1955) , although they appeared earlier, for instance in the work of Johansson (1937) . In CPC, all admissible rules are derivable, but this is not the case for IPC. An early example of a non-derivable but admissible rule of IPC is the following rule due to Harrop (1960) , known as independence of premise. Prucnal (1979) proved that this rule is admissible for all intermediate logics. 5 Later, Minari and Wroński (1988) proved that, in the above, ¬χ can be replaced by an arbitrary Harrop formula, all the while maintaining admissibility. Problem 40 of Friedman (1975) states that the set of admissible rules of IPC is decidable, which has been proven by Rybakov (1984) . Iemhoff (2001b) and Rozière (1992) independently proved that the Visser rules are sufficient to derive all single-conclusion admissible rules of IPC. This result was later generalised to the the logics of bounded branching by Goudsmit and Iemhoff (2014) .
In this paper, we show that the study of admissible rules is closely related to the study of refutation systems. In particular, we provide a refutation system for the logics of bounded branching T n , also known as the Gabbay-de Jongh logics, making use of admissible rules similar to those given by Goudsmit and Iemhoff (2014) . The method naturally extends to cover IPC, providing an intimate connection between the characterisation of IPC in terms of its multi-conclusion admissible rules, as given by Iemhoff (2001a) , and the structural refutation system of Skura (1989) . Moreover, the same machinery applies to Medvedev's Logic, re-proving a result by Skura (1992) . 5 In this paper, Prucnal also solved problem 41 of Friedman (1975) . This problem, rephrased in modern language, conjectured that there exists an intermediate logic with the disjunction property for which all admissible rules are derivable. The logic Prucnal used was Medvedev's logic. See Wojtylak (2004) for an exposition of this result, and see Grigolia (1995) for an algebraic proof. We revisit Medvedev's logic in Section 3.
Preliminaries
We work over the full propositional language on a set of variables X defined by the following Backus-Nauer form:
L(X) ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | X | L(X) ∧ L(X) | L(X) ∨ L(X) | L(X) → L(X).
Sets of variables will be denoted by X, Y and variables by their lower-case variants. Formulae will be denoted ϕ, ψ, χ, θ and sets of formulae by Γ, Π, ∆, Θ. Given a finite set of formulae ∆ we write ∧ ∆ and ∨ ∆ for the iterated conjunction and disjunction of ∆, in the understanding that ∧ ∅ = ⊤ and ∨ ∅ = ⊥. We define a rule to be a pair of finite sets of formulae, written Γ/∆.
We wish not to be concerned with the intricacies of different axiomatisations of logics. In order to avoid this, we make use of multi-conclusion consequence relations. We refer to Wójcicki (1988) for background on consequence relations, and to Iemhoff (2013) for an in-depth description of the use of consequence relations surrounding admissible rules. The multi-conclusion variant we use here is taken from Scott (1971 Scott ( , 1974 . The main difference with the definition in Cintula and Metcalfe (2010) is that we do not assume structurality in a consequence relation.
Definition (Multi-conclusion Consequence Relation)
A set of rules ⊢ is called a multi-conclusion consequence relation whenever it is closed under the following for all finite sets of formulae Γ, Π, ∆, Θ and formulae ψ. Here we write Γ ⊢ ∆ to mean (Γ/∆) ∈ ⊢.
2 If Π ⊆ Γ, Θ ⊆ ∆ and Π ⊢ Θ then Γ ⊢ ∆;
3 If Γ ⊢ ψ, ∆ and Γ, ψ ⊢ ∆ then Γ ⊢ ∆.
The above three conditions, and the corresponding conditions in Definition 3, are respectively called reflexivity, weakening and transitivity. Whenever Γ ⊢ ∆ entails σ(Γ) ⊢ σ(∆) for all substitutions σ, we say that the consequence relation ⊢ is structural. We think of consequence relations as describing derivability, so if Γ ⊢ ∆ we say that ∆ is derivable from Γ. When we say that a formula ϕ is derivable, we mean that {ϕ} is derivable from ∅. Such formulae we also call theorems.
Given any set of rules R, one can consider the least consequence relation containing these rules, which we will denote by ⊢ R . When R is structural, in the sense that it is closed under substitutions, it is clear that ⊢ R is structural as well. This is easy to see when we think of ⊢ R as being inductively defined, with the base-case explicating that ⊢ R is an extension of R, and the inductive cases ensuring closure under the three conditions of Definition 1.
By IPC we mean the set of theorems of intuitionistic propositional logic, see for instance Troelstra and Dalen (1988) . An intermediate logic L is a proper subset of the set of all formulae, that contains IPC, and that satisfies:
In particular, IPC is an intermediate logic. We refer to the first rule as being closed under substitutions, and the latter as being closed under modus ponens.
To each intermediate logic L we associate a multi-conclusion consequence relation ⊢ L , as below in (1). Note that this consequence relation is structural. We can see this as a special case of the relation ⊢ R described above, when we let R be the set of all rules Γ/∆ satisfying the right-hand condition in (1) below.
Γ ⊢ L ∆ if and only if
There can be many consequence relations with the same set of theorems. We, for instance, could also consider the consequence relation defined by the following, and the set of theorems would be exactly the same as that of ⊢ L .
In this paper we focus on multi-conclusion admissible rules, as first suggested by Kracht (1999) , and used in the context of modal logic by Jeřábek (2005) and intermediate logics by Goudsmit (2013a) . Admissible rules, as defined by the aforementioned authors, are inherently structural. We first define refutation rules much like Skura (2009), 6 and using this definition we define admissible rules. Note that our notion of a refutation rule has both multiple conclusions and multiple assumptions. For our purposes we quickly will forget the multiple assumptions, as for intermediate logics this difference is immaterial.
Definition (Refutation Rules & Admissible Rules)
Let ⊢ be a consequence relation. We say that Γ/∆ is a refutation rule with respect to ⊢ if ⊢ χ holds for some χ ∈ ∆ when ⊢ ϕ holds for all ϕ ∈ Γ. A rule is said to be an admissible rule, denoted Γ ∆, when σ(Γ)/σ(∆) is a refutation rule for all substitutions σ.
Naturally, itself is again a multi-conclusion consequence relation. Given any set of refutation rules R one can consider ⊢ R , and it can be readily proven that all rules in ⊢ R are refutation rules with respect to ⊢. As remarked above, when R is structural then ⊢ R is structural as well. These observations combine to show that is structural. Also note that if ⊢ is structural, then is an extension of ⊢.
In the following few paragraphs, we will show how the system of refutation rules for CPC, as given in the introduction, can be seen as a kind of consequence relation. Let us first define R as
Consider MT, which states that ⊣ ψ and ϕ ⊢ CPC ψ entail ⊣ ϕ. From this observation, it naturally follows that if ϕ ⊢ CPC ψ then ψ/ϕ is contained in R. It is also easy to see that the reversal of this rule, ϕ/ψ, is a refutation rule with respect to ⊢ CPC . In a similar manner Subs corresponds to the rule σ(ϕ)/ϕ, which is an element of R, and its reversal is a refutation rule. One can also see that
x/∅ is a valid refutation rule by virtue of x, or any variable for that matter, being non-derivable in ⊢ CPC . This rule, of course, corresponds to Ax.
From the above, we can conclude that the rules of the refutation system of CPC correspond to refutation rules in the formal sense of Definition 2. Moreover, see that R satisfies the singleconclusion variants of Definition 1, as given in Definition 3.
3 Definition (Single-conclusion Consequence Relation) A relation ⊢ between finite sets of formulae and formulae is called a consequence relation whenever the following hold for all finite sets of formulae Γ, Π, ∆ and formulae χ and θ.
As the above argument suggests, it makes good sense to define a refutation system with respect to ⊢ as being a single-conclusion consequence relation R such that:
if ∆ R ϕ then ϕ/∆ is a refutation rule with respect to ⊢.
Analogously to the situation with multiple-conclusion consequence relations, one can define a least single-conclusion consequence extending a given set of rules R. When we take R to be the set of all rules ∆/ϕ satisfying (3) then Lemma 1 below shows that R itself is a single-conclusion consequence relation.
Lemma
Let ⊢ be a (multi-conclusion) consequence relation, let R be a set of rules each satisfying (3) and let ⊢ R be the least single-conclusion consequence relation extending R. All rules in ⊢ R satisfy (3). In particular, the reverse of the totality of all refutation rules is a consequence relation.
Proof By induction along the inference of ∆ R ϕ, we prove that ϕ/∆ is a refutation rule. The base case follows by assumption. We only treat the case of transitivity. Suppose ∆ 1 , θ R ϕ and ∆ 2 R θ with ∆ = ∆ 1 ∪ ∆ 2 . By induction, we know both ϕ/(∆ 1 ∪ {θ}) and θ/∆ 2 to be refutation rules. Assume that ⊢ ϕ holds. This ensures us that either ⊢ θ or ⊢ χ for some χ ∈ ∆ 1 . In the former case, it follows that ⊢ χ for some χ ∈ ∆ 2 . Hence ⊢ χ for some χ ∈ ∆ holds in both cases, finishing the argument. ■
We call a refutation system complete whenever ̸ ⊢ ϕ is equivalent to ⊣ ϕ, for all formulae ϕ. In symbols, ⊣ = ̸ ⊢. Following Słupecki, Bryll, and Wybraniec-Skardowska (1971) , we say that a logic is Ł-decidable when it has a complete refutation system.
In Definition 4 below, we construct refutation systems out of a basic set of "falsehoods" (or antiaxioms) Θ and a set of rules R. These are the types of structural systems we wish to consider. Do note that the reverse of ⊢ Rf is not structural in the sense of consequence relations, and indeed, for our purposes, never could be. For whenever ⊢ is a consequence relation corresponding to an intermediate logic, it is clear that variables must be refutable, yet anything is a substitution instance of a variable.
As remarked above Lemma 1, the reversal of the rules in a refutation system ought to be refutation rules. It is clear that the conditions (1)-(3) all satisfy this, hence Lemma 1 guarantees that ⊢ Rf indeed meets this requirement.
Definition
Let ⊢ be a (multi-conclusion) consequence relation, let Θ be a set of non-derivable formulae and let R be a set of admissible rules. The refutation system determined by Θ and R is the least singleconclusion consequence relation ⊢ Rf such that the following hold.
2 σ(ϕ) ⊢ Rf ϕ for all formulae ϕ and all substitutions σ;
The above definition can be reformulated in the same form as the refutation system given in the introduction, as we state in Lemma 2 below. We will use this form throughout the following, silently sidestepping the single-conclusion consequence relation formulation of Definition 4. One can think of the relation ⊢ Rf⊣ , defined within the proof below, as a formalised version of the relation ⊣ of Lemma 1. Intuitively speaking, whereas in Lemma 1 we consider all refutation rules, in Lemma 2 we restrict ourselves to those rules where the refutation can be "witnessed formally" by the predicate ⊣ (−).
Lemma
Let the situation be as in Definition 4 and inductively define the predicate ⊣ (−) on formulae as below. We now have ∅ ⊢ Rf ϕ precisely if ⊣ ϕ for any formula ϕ.
Proof By structural induction along the definition of ⊣ (−), it immediately follows that if ⊣ ϕ then ∅ ⊢ Rf ϕ. Indeed, in the base case we have ⊣ ϕ because ϕ ∈ Θ, so ∅ ⊢ Rf ϕ holds by definition. Now suppose that ⊣ ϕ holds because of Subs. Induction ensures us that ∅ ⊢ Rf σ(ϕ), and we know that σ(ϕ) ⊢ Rf ϕ holds as well. Through transitivity, as provided by Definition 3.(3), it is immediate that ∅ ⊢ Rf ϕ.
To prove the other direction, we first define an auxiliary relation ⊢ Rf⊣ as follows:
The desired will be obtained through the following two claims. Indeed, assuming both claims it is clear that if ∅ ⊢ Rf ϕ then ∅ ⊢ Rf⊣ ϕ by (1), and so ⊣ by (2). It is clear that (2) holds, and the proof of (1) is similar to a contrapositive formulation of Lemma 1.
1 ⊢ Rf is a subset of ⊢ Rf⊣ ; 2 ∅ ⊢ Rf⊣ ϕ holds precisely if ⊣ ϕ for any formula ϕ. ■
To prove results on admissibility, it is often convenient to reason semantically. For this purpose we use Kripke models, see e.g. Troelstra and Dalen (1988) or Chagrov and Zakharyaschev (1997) . A Kripke model on a set of variables X is a partial order K together with a monotone map v : K → PX, called a valuation, where PX denotes the set of subsets of X ordered by inclusion. We define v, k ⊩ ϕ for formulae ϕ ∈ L(X) and nodes k ∈ K as usual. Given a node k ∈ K we write Th (v, k) for the theory of this node, that is, the set of ϕ ∈ L(X) such that v, k ⊩ ϕ. We abbreviate ∩ k∈K Th (v, k) as Th (v, K). We will also write Th (K) to mean the intersection of all Th (v, K) for sets X and monotone maps v : K → PX.
When there is little chance of confusion, we simply say that K is a model, and omit reference to both X and v. Maps between models on X are, as usual, bounded morphisms or p-morphisms. For partial orders P we write W ↑ for W ⊆ P to mean the upset generated by W , that is to say, the set {p ∈ P | w ≤ p for some w ∈ W }. Similarly we write W ↑ ↑ to mean the strict upset generated by W , defined as W ↑ − W . A subset W ⊆ P is said to be an anti-chain when all elements are pairwise incomparable. We write max W for the set of maximal elements in W , where we consider an element k to be maximal if k ↑ = {k}.
We will make heavy use of the machinery described by Goudsmit (2013b) . Much of this is folklore, for more background and references to the literature we refer to the aforementioned. The main definitions and results we depend upon are given below, with sparse motivation.
Definition (Cover)
Let K be a model,
Definition
Let v : K → PX be a model. We say that K is concrete when for every pair a, b ∈ K we have that a = b whenever both
Let us give some pointers to the use of these definitions in the context of this paper. It is easy to verify that every refined model is concrete, the converse holds for image-finite models by Theo-
. This immediately proves a = b whenever K is refined. Also note that every map whose domain is a refined model has to be injective. As a consequence, concrete image-finite models (over a set of variables) are isomorphic to rooted subsets of the universal model of IPC (over that same set of variables) as defined in Theorem 1. From this observation, Lemma 5 is quite easy to obtain. For a proof we refer to Goudsmit (2013b, Corollary 4).
Theorem
Let X be a finite set of variables. There is a model
and its theory consists of the L-theorems in L(X).
Below we introduce the Jankov (1963 )-de Jongh (1968 . We refer to up k as the "upset formula" and nd k as the "not-downset formula" of k. When K is a rooted model, we sometimes write up K and nd K to refer to the upset-and not-downset formula of the root of K. A proof of Theorem 2, in the notation employed here, can be found in Goudsmit (2013b, Theorem 2), cf. Bezhanishvili (2006, Section 3.3) .
Definition (Characteristic Formulae)
Let v : K → PX be an image-finite model. Per node k ∈ K we define:
by well-founded recursion as follows, where W denotes the set of immediate successors of k.
We will write up U to mean ∨ k∈U up k.
Theorem
For any concrete image finite model K and all a,
. From here, the desired is immediate. ■
Lemma
Let v : K → PX be a finite concrete model. To every model w :
Proof For convenience, we write coz u (ϕ) :
This is the set of elements of K which, under the valuation u, make the formula ϕ true. We define σ on variables as below. This definition is well-defined due to the finiteness of K, which ensures that coz w (ϕ) is finite and hence definable by means of a Jankov-de Jongh formula.
Let us now prove, by structural induction along ϕ, that
For propositional variables, this much is clear. Indeed, k ∈ coz v (σ(ϕ)) holds precisely if k ∈ coz w (ϕ). Let us treat the implicative case where ϕ = ψ → χ, all other cases can be proven similarly. Consider the following chain of equivalences, where the second equivalence is through Theorem 2, the fourth through induction and the final one again through Theorem 2.
The following lemma illustrates that one can endow any partial order with a concrete model. By using the elements of the order as variables, all elements can easily be distinguished, making the proof of concreteness straightforward.
Let K be a partial order. Define the valuation v K as below. The model v K : K → PK is concrete.
The following lemma occurs in several places surrounding refutability, let us mention but a few. For intermediate logics, see Skura (1989, Lemma 1), Skura (1990) , Skura (1992, Theorem 2.2) and Skura (1999, Section 4.2), a similar lemma for modal logics is covered in Skura (1994, Lemma 3.1) and Goranko (1994, Lemma 1.3. 3).
Let K be a finite rooted partial order
Proof Let K be a partial order and consider the concrete model
, and so by Corollary 1 we obtain σ(ϕ) ⊢ IPC nd k. As nd v K = nd k, we have thus proven the desired. ■
The following lemma will be used to prove Lemma 11, a crucial step towards Theorem 6, in which we present a refutation system for Medvedev's logic. We include the proof because the implication from (1) to (2) is a good illustration of the use of Jankov-de Jongh formulae, and it provides some of the flavour of the arguments to come in Section 2. From this lemma, the characterisation as given by Maksimova (1986, Lemma 7) naturally follows through Lemma 4.
Let v : K → PX be an image-finite model and let n ∈ N be a natural number. Now (2) implies (1), and the converse holds whenever v is concrete.
1 For all ϕ ∈ L(X) and ∆ ⊆ L(X) with |∆| ≤ n, we have
Proof Suppose that (2) does not hold, and assume that (1) does hold. This yields some W ⊆ max K with |W | ≤ n and an a ∈ K with W ⊆ max a↑ such that, for all b ≥ a, we have max b↑ ̸ = W . As a consequence, we know that for all b ≥ a that whenever
Observe that, for any k ∈ K, we have the following, as follows directly through Theorem 2.
From here, (4) and (5) yield some w ∈ W such that a ⊩ ¬ϕ → ¬up w. Because a ≤ w and w ̸ ⊩ ϕ and w ⊩ up w, we reached a contradiction, proving (1) to not hold, as desired.
Now assume that v is concrete and that (2) holds. Let ϕ ∈ L(X) and ∆ ⊆ L(X) with |∆| ≤ n be given. We proceed by contradiction, so we assume that there is an a ∈ K with
The latter ensures the existence of
It is clear that W ⊆ max a↑, and so, by assumption, we know of a b ≥ a such that W = max b↑. From here it is clear that b ⊩ ¬ϕ, so from (6) we know b ⊩ ∨ χ∈∆ ¬χ. This gives us some χ ∈ ∆ such that b ⊩ ¬χ. As a consequence w χ ⊩ ¬χ, which is blatantly fase, proving (1). ■
Admissible Rules
The consequence relation ⊢ IPC has an associated relation of admissibility . It is easy to see that ⊥ ∅. Indeed, ⊢ IPC σ(⊥) simply does not hold for any σ, so this rule is vacuously admissible. This is is an example of what Rybakov, Terziler, and Gencer (1999) call a passive rule. Note that this rule is, in our definition of ⊢ IPC , both derivable and admissible. Another example of a rule is x ∨ y/{x, y}. This rule is admissible for ⊢ IPC , and the argument to show this uses the well-known fact that IPC has the disjunction property.
Consider again the independence of premise rule IPR, as covered in the introduction, listed in Fig. 2 . A straightforward argument can show its non-derivability, a Kripke model with but three nodes suffices. Intuitively, this rule allows for the distribution of an implication from a negative formula over a disjunction. IPR was generalised by Harrop (1960, Theorem 3 .1) to allow for a wider class of formulae on the left-hand side. Both of these results have been generalised from IPC to arbitrary intermediate logics, the former by Prucnal (1979) and the latter by Minari and Wroński (1988) .
The following rule was shown to be both admissible and non-derivable for IPC by Mints (1976) .
Citkin (1977) generalised it by taking a disjunction with a fixed variable in both the assumption and conclusion. This amounts to what is now known as the first Visser rule, see Citkin (2012) for more details. Moreover, Citkin (1979a,b) presented these now so-called Visser rules, and conjectured that all admissible rules of IPC follow from them. 7 D. H. J. de Jongh and A. Visser formulated the Visser rules in the eighties, but they did not publish their formulation until much later. 8 Rozière (1992) and Iemhoff (2001a) independently proved that these rules suffice to derive all admissible rules of IPC. In this section, we discuss variants of the Visser rules as given by Iemhoff (2005, Section 4) .
A list of the variants of the Visser rules we wish to consider is given in Fig. 2 . The scheme V − n gives what are known as the restricted Visser rules (cf. Iemhoff (2005)). From Iemhoff (2005, Theorem 4.7) and Theorem 3 below it follows that all of these rules are admissible precisely if D − n are admissible for all n ∈ N. We consider the variants D − n , D n , and D n , because these correspond to the semantic properties introduced by Iemhoff (2005) . Moreover, they stratify smoothly along the intermediate logics of bounded branching. Also note that the admissibility of D n is equivalent to the property P n of Iemhoff (2001a, Definition 2).
Figure 2: Several schemes of rules, all admissible for IPC.
In many situations, admissibility of some of the above rules corresponds quite nicely to certain semantic properties. Below we give these semantic properties. Note that the latter two relate intimately to the weak extension property and the offspring property of Iemhoff (2005, Section 2.5) respectively, as can be seen through an argument similar to that in Corollary 3. A deep discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper, but sufficed to say that through Goudsmit (2013b, Corollary 6) it is clear that the class of models of an intermediate logic L has the weak extension property precisely if its canonical model is weakly n-ary covered for all n ∈ N.
One can read Lemma 7 and Theorem 3 with K instantiated as U L (X). Given that L has the finite model property, it is easy to see that the implications of Lemma 7 then neatly correspond to the previously discussed rule schemes, as spelled out in Corollary 2. In this lies the appeal of the properties of Definition 8; their validity in the universal model is exactly reflected by the admissibility of a scheme of admissible rules.
Definition (Model Properties)
We say that a model is:
1 downwards directed when each finite set of elements has a lower bound;
2 weakly n-ary covered when each set of size at most n with a lower bound is a cover of some node;
3 strongly n-ary covered when each set of size at most n with a lower bound, say k, is a cover of some node, say l, and there is a lower bound of l and k.
Lemma
Let K be a model. The following hold.
2 If K is weakly n-ary covered then for all ∆ and ϕ with |∆| ≤ n we have that
3 If K is strongly n-ary covered then for all ∆ and ϕ with |∆| ≤ n we have that
Proof Assume that K is downwards directed, and suppose ∆ is a set of formulae such that K ̸ ⊩ χ for all χ ∈ ∆. Per χ ∈ ∆, this yields a w χ ∈ K such that w χ ̸ ⊩ χ. By downwards directness, we know there to be a k ∈ K such that k ≤ w χ , for all χ ∈ ∆. If k ⊩ ∨ ∆ then k ⊩ χ for some χ ∈ ∆, and as such, w χ ⊩ χ by construction. Via this contradiction, we arrive at (1). Now suppose that K is strongly covered, and take ∆ and ϕ, ψ to be such that
See that W := {w χ | χ ∈ ∆} has a lower bound, namely k. It is also quite clear that |W | ≤ n. As K is strongly n-ary covered this yields l, l ′ ∈ K with W κ l, and
We omit a proof of (2), the reader will be able to reconstruct a proof of this statement from the above argument. ■
Theorem
Let K be an image finite and concrete model. All implications of Lemma 7 are equivalences.
Proof For (1), let W ⊆ K be of size at most n. Observe that w ̸ ⊩ nd w, and as such, K ̸ ⊩ up w for all w ∈ W . By assumption, it follows that K ̸ ⊩ ∨ w∈W nd w. This yields a k ∈ K such that k ̸ ⊩ nd w, which in turn precisely proves that k is a lower bound for W .
We now treat (3), see Goudsmit (2013b, Theorem 3) for a proof of (2). Suppose that W ⊆ K is finite and has a lower bound, say k. For convenience define
Indeed, both disjuncts are clearly falsified at k. Remark that |∆| ≤ n. By assumption, this ensures the existence of some l ′ ∈ K such that
Because l ′ falsifies the left-hand disjunct we know l ≤ k. Similarly, because l ′ falsifies the righthand disjunct, we obtain a l ≥ l ′ such that W κ l by Goudsmit (2013b, Corollary 7), where K is to be read as l ′ ↑. This proves the desired. ■ Corollary 2 below follows immediately from the above Theorem 3 and the completeness of universal models, as stated in Theorem 1. See Corollary 3 as an illustration of how the "internal" relation of being downwards directed relates to a well-known property of the models of a logic, cf. Maksimova (1986, Theorem 1) and Gabbay and de Jongh (1974, Lemma 14) .
Corollary
Let L be an intermediate logic with the finite model property. Now L has the disjunction property precisely if its universal models are downwards directed. Moreover, L admits D − n (or D n ) precisely if its universal models are weakly (or strongly) n-ary covered.
Any intermediate logic L with the finite model property has the disjunction property precisely if to every pair of finite rooted models K 1 and K 2 there is a rooted model K such that there are nodes k 1 , k 2 ∈ K and morphisms f i :
Proof We show only the implication from left to right, the other direction is of similar difficulty. Suppose that L has the disjunction property and let K 1 and K 2 be arbitrary models. Without loss of generality, we may assume that K 1 and K 2 are models on the same set of variables X. By Theorem 1 we know of
We know L to have the disjunction property, so Corollary 2 ensures us that
We take K := k ↑, and this completes the argument. ■ A basis of admissibility is, intuitively, a set of admissible rules from which all others follow. We define this notion formally below.
Definition (Basis of Admissible Rules)
A set of admissible rules R ⊆ is a basis of admissibility ⊢ R equals .
Remark
When R 1 and R 2 are sets of admissible rules such that ⊢ R 1 = ⊢ R 2 it is clear that the structural refutation system determined by Θ and R 1 equals that determined by Θ and R 2 for any set of formulae Θ. In particular, if R is a basis of admissible rules then the structural refutation system determined by Θ and R equals that determined by Θ and . As such, basis of admissibility are of interest in constructing succinct structural refutation systems.
Admissible Approximations
Consider an arbitrary intermediate logic L and its consequence relation ⊢ L as a preorder on the set of propositional formulae on a fixed, countably infinite, set of variables. When considering L as a preorder in a similar manner, it becomes apparent that the former is a sub-preorder of the latter. Consequently, one can wonder whether this inclusion functor has a left adjoint. Ghilardi (1999, p. 874 ) proved that such a left adjoint exists in the case where L is IPC. When this left-adjoint exists we call the image of a formula ϕ under it the admissible approximation of ϕ. 9
Admissible approximations are useful in proving a certain set of rules to be a basis of admissibility. For examples of the use of this concept see Iemhoff (2001b, Theorem 3.13 ), Jeřábek (2005, Theorem 4.5), Jeřábek (2010, Theorem 3.8), Goudsmit and Iemhoff (2014, Theorem 3) , and Goudsmit (2013b, Lemma 20) . In this section, we illustrate how admissible approximations come into play when constructing refutation systems. We introduce a very particular type of model, the admissible approximation of the not-downset formulae of which will be a disjunction of classically non-derivable formulae.
It should be noted that the results we obtain about admissible approximations are not necessary, strictly speaking, to obtain our end-results on refutability. We do include them here to drive home the idea that bases of admissibility and refutation systems can be quite closely related.
Recall that to each partial order one can assign a valuation such that the resulting model is concrete, as shown in Lemma 4. The valuation there is such that all elements of the underlying order are assigned distinct variables. In Definition 10, we specify a kind of partial order for which we can construct a more "economic" valuation, taking values only in the maximal nodes of K. This valuation will assign to an element the set of maximal elements above it. There are situations in which this will suffice to distinguish between all elements, for instance when the underlying partial order is a proper tree, as shown in Lemma 8.
The advantage of such a valuation will become clear by Lemma 14, very roughly speaking, the formulae up k and nd k will be of a form amenable to manipulation by the earlier described admissible rules. See Fig. 3 for examples and non-examples of the notions introduced in the following definition. The partial order K 1 is maximally separable and K 1 , K 2 and K 3 are maximally distinguishable. Note that K 2 , K 3 and K 4 are most certainly not maximally separable, and the latter is not maximally distinguishable.
Definition (Maximally Separable and Distinguishable)
Let K be a partial order. We say that K is maximally separable when the following equivalence holds for all a, b ∈ K a ≤ b iff max b↑ ⊆ max a↑. 9 We deviate a little from the currently prevalent use of the term "admissible approximation" in doing this. More commonly, as for instance in Jeřábek (2010, Definition 3.6) and Goudsmit and Iemhoff (2014, Definition 19 ), a close connection to "projective approximations" as introduced by Ghilardi (1999) is maintained. An admissible approximation of ϕ thus commonly is defined to be a set of formulae ∆ satisfying certain properties such that ∨ ∆ is an admissible approximation in the above sense. We do not need these additional properties in the following exposition, hence our sloppiness in employing this term.
Figure 3: Examples of maximal separability and distinguishability.
We call K maximally distinguishable when the model m K defined below is concrete.
Recall that IPC is complete with respect to the Jaśkowski sequence, a particular sequence of proper trees, see Smoryński (1973) and Surma, Wroński, and Zachorowski (1975) for more details. We point out that proper finite trees are maximally separable. 10 To be completely precise, a tree is a rooted partial order T such that for all a, b, c ∈ T with a, b ≤ c we have a ≤ b or b ≤ a. A tree T is said to be proper when a κ b if and only if a = b for all a, b ∈ T .
Lemma Every finite tree is maximally separable if and only if it is proper.
Proof Let T be a finite tree, and suppose that T is proper. In the latter case, we obtain a contradiction because m < a, and m is maximal. By maximal separability, we now know that a ≤ b, yet b ≤ a was known. Consequently a = b follows, a contradiction, proving the desired. ■
Lemma
Let K be a maximally separable partial order, and endow it with the valuation m K . For each a, b ∈ K we have
In particular K is maximally distinguishable. 
Let K be a concrete and image-finite model on X, let k ∈ K be given, and let W ⊆ K be an anti-chain such that W κ k and |W | ̸ = 1. We now know
Proof By Theorem 1, we know K to correspond to a node in U IPC (X), for convenience's sake we use the same name for the node in K and its corresponding node in U IPC (X). Through Theorem 2, we need to prove that the following are equivalent for a ∈ U IPC (X).
Suppose (1) There must be a node w − ∈ W with w − ̸ = b. Yet we know b ≤ w − , violating the assumption that W is an anti-chain. All cases reach a contradiction, so (1) follows. ■ Before we continue along our main line of reasoning, let us first spend a few words on Medvedev's logic. The purpose of this intermezzo is to motivate Definition 12. In Theorem 5 we show that this definition can be used to define complete refutation systems, which we use to obtain our end-result, Theorem 11. Our proof is based upon the reasoning of Maksimova (1986) , but given in terms of the machinery described above. We moreover employ a characterisation of Levin (1969) as described by Wojtylak (2004) . The refutation system we eventually obtain in Theorem 6 is the same as given by Skura (1992, Theorem 6.1).
Definition (Medvedev's Logic)
Per set X the Medvedev frame, denoted B(X), is PX − ∅ ordered by ⊇. Medvedev's Logic ML is the intermediate logic defined by
Through the theorem of Glivenko (1929) 
A formula is said to be disjunctive-negative in L whenever, within L, it is equivalent to a formula of the above left-hand form. Note that this differs from the definition on Maksimova (1986) , who requires a formula to be syntactically of the above form. We say that a formula ϕ is essentially negative when each variable occurs within the scope of a negation. More symbolically, the set of essentially negative formulae on X, denoted L -(X), is defined by
Consider the intermediate logic ND defined below, as introduced by Maksimova (1986) . It is a straightforward observation that the logic KP of Kreisel and Putnam (1957) is an extension of ND.
We mention some elementary properties of KP and ML in Lemma 11, both of which are crucial for Theorem 4.
Lemma
The logics ML and KP are extensions of ND and both have the disjunction property.
Proof That KP has the disjunction property is proven by Kreisel and Putnam (1957, p. 75) . By Maksimova (1986, Proposition 2) it is clear that ML has the disjunction property as well.
From the definitions of both KP and ND, it is immediate that the latter contains the former. Let us prove that ML is an extension of ND. To this end, let X ̸ = ∅ be a finite set and consider any model v : B(X) → PY . Let W ⊆ max B(X) and a ∈ B(X) be such that W ⊆ max a↑. By Lemma 6, it suffices to show that there exists an element b ∈ B(X) satisfying both a ≤ b and max b↑ = W . Such an element always exists, simply take b := ∪ W , and see that it satisfies all requirements.
■ In ND, all essentially negative formulae are in fact disjunctive negative, as we prove below. This statement is but a minor reformulation of Maksimova (1986, Lemma 4) .
Let ϕ ∈ L(X) be a formula, and let σ :
Moreover, ⊢ KP ϕ precisely if ⊢ ML ϕ. 11
Proof The former statement can be proven by means of a straightforward inductive argument along the structure of ϕ. Let us focus on the second statement, and prove the implication from left to right. Suppose that ⊢ KP ϕ. Through (8) and Lemma 11 it follows that there is some χ ∈ ∆ such that ⊢ KP ¬χ. By Glivenko's theorem we now know that ⊢ ML ¬χ. Another application of (8) and Lemma 11 yield ⊢ ML ϕ as desired. ■ Fix a finite maximally separable partial order K, and endow it with the valuation m K . From Lemma 9 we know that for all a, b ∈ K the following holds.
Intuitively, this amounts to saying that a lies below b precisely when every maximal element that is not above a is not above b. In maximally separable models, this naturally holds, as proven in Lemma 9. Through this equivalence, one can readily infer that the substitution ρ, as defined below, is such that
We employ this substitution in Theorem 4 below. This theorem shows that to each formula that is non-derivability in ML there must be a substitution instance that is not derivable in KP. We spell this out in a bit more detail in Corollary 4.
Theorem (Levin, 1969)
The following are equivalent for any formula ϕ ∈ L(X):
2 For all finite sets Y and all essentially negative substitutions σ :
Proof Suppose (1) holds and let σ be essentially negative. From Lemma 12 we know that ⊢ ML σ(ϕ) and ⊢ KP σ(ϕ) are equivalent. Structurality ensures the former, hence (2) holds. Now suppose that (1) does not hold. This gives us some finite Z ̸ = ∅ and a valuation v :
The partial order K := B(Z) is maximally separable, and hence the model
is concrete due to Lemma 9. Indeed, we know that k ∈ B(X) is maximal precisely if k is a singleton. Now observe that a ≤ {x} implies b ≤ {x} for all x ∈ X precisely means that a ⊆ b, which is equivalent to b ≤ a. This proves that K is indeed maximally separable.
For convenience we write Y := max K. By Lemma 3, we know of a substitution τ : (9), and define σ :
It is clear that this substitution is essentially negative.
By Lemma 12, we now know that
due to the remark above this theorem. This, in turn, would yield v ⊩ ϕ, a contradiction proving (2) not to hold. ■
Corollary
Let ⊢ be the least structural consequence relation extending both ⊢ KP and x ∨ y/{x, y}. For any formula ϕ, we have that ̸ ⊢ ML ϕ precisely if there is a substitution σ and a finite set of formulae ∆, each non-derivable in CPC, such that σ(ϕ) ⊢ ∆.
Proof From left to right we assume ̸ ⊢ ML ϕ. By Theorem 4, we get an essentially negative substitution σ such that ̸ ⊢ KP σ(ϕ). Due to Lemma 12, this gives to a set formulae ∆ such that σ(ϕ) ⊢ ND ∨ ∆. Note that (7) ensures that each of the formulae in ∆ is non-derivable in CPC. It follows from Lemma 11 that ⊢ ND ⊆ ⊢ KP , so the above combine to show σ(ϕ) ⊢ ∆, as desired.
To prove the converse, we suppose σ(ϕ) ⊢ ∆ for a particular substitution σ and a set of formulae ∆ non-derivable in CPC. It follows from Lemma 11 that ⊢ ⊆ ML . Now see that if ⊢ ML ϕ, then ⊢ ML σ(ϕ) by structurality, so ⊢ ML χ holds for some χ ∈ ∆. Yet this entails ⊢ CPC χ, a contradiction. ■
The following property is a generalisation of the above Corollary 4. In Theorem 5, we show that if a logic L is such that ⊢ L has this property then it is complete with respect to the refutation system generated by the set of non-derivable formulae Θ and rules R. More concretely, in Theorem 6 we use this general machinery to give a refutation system for ML.
Definition (Admissibly Reducible)
We say that a consequence relation ⊢ is admissibly reducible to Θ through R when the following hold:
1 Θ is a set of formulae, and each formula in Θ is non-derivable in ⊢;
2 R is a set of rules closed under substitutions, and each rule in R is admissible with respect to ⊢; 3 for each ϕ the following equivalence holds
Note that, in the above definition, the formulae Θ are necessarily non-derivable in L, even without assuming this, whenever R contains reflexivity. Indeed, for each θ ∈ Θ we then have that θ R {θ} and so ̸ ⊢ L θ follows. However, it need not be the case that the formulae in Θ are non-derivable in CPC. 12
Through a slight abuse of language, we will say that an intermediate logic L is admissibly reducible to Θ through R whenever ⊢ L is. Let us give the following lemma to illustrate the definition. Let L be an intermediate logic. Now L is admissibly reducible to ∅ through L precisely if L = CPC.
Proof From right to left, we assume ϕ ∈ L(X) to be such that ̸ ⊢ CPC ϕ. This gives a model v : { * } → PX such that v ̸ ⊩ ϕ, where { * } is the one-point partial order. Define the substitution σ : L(X) → L(∅) by mapping x ∈ X to ⊤ if x ∈ v( * ) and to ⊥ otherwise. It is easy to verify that σ(ϕ) ≡ ⊥, and thus σ(ϕ) CPC ∅.
To prove the other direction, we proceed by contraposition. Assume that L ⊂ CPC and remark that ϕ := ¬¬x → x is such that ̸ ⊢ L ϕ. Consider any substitution σ and observe that CPC ⊢ σ(ϕ). This yields a a substitution τ such that IPC ⊢ τ (σ(ϕ)) ≡ ⊤. As a consequence, σ(ϕ) L ∅ can not hold, proving the desired. ■
To connect Definition 12 to the above discussion, remark that in Corollary 4 it is argued that ML is admissibly reducible to the set of all non-derivable formulae in CPC through the set of rules
Theorem
Let L be an intermediate logic admissibly reducible to Θ through R. The refutation system determined by Θ and R is complete and, hence L is Ł-decidable. Moreover, when Θ is the set of formulae non-derivable in CPC then the refutation system determined by {⊥} and R ∪ ⊢ IPC is already complete.
Proof In order to prove completeness, we assume ϕ to be some formula such that ̸ ⊢ ϕ. By assumption, we obtain a substitution σ and a finite subset ∆ ⊆ Θ such that σ(ϕ) R ∆. We now compute the following, where the first and last relation follow immediately by Definition 4.
Through transitivity, we thus infer ⊢ Rf ϕ.
Let us now focus on the final statement. To prove completeness, it suffices to show that ⊥ ⊢ Rf θ for arbitrary θ ∈ Θ. Take X such that θ ∈ L(X) and know that, as ̸ ⊢ CPC θ by assumption, there must be some σ : (Skura, 1992) The refutation system below is both sound and complete for ML.
Proof This is a direct consequence of Lemma 2, Theorem 5 and Corollary 4. ■
The remainder of this section is devoted to developing the conditions under which not-down formulae of models can play the role of ϕ in Definition 12. Let us take a brief detour through admissible approximations. Recall the motivation of this notion, as given at the start of this section. To be concrete, we say that ψ is an admissible approximation of ϕ whenever the following holds for all formulae χ: ϕ χ if and only if ψ ⊢ χ.
The intuitive feel to the following is that one can iterative compute the admissible approximation of a formula nd m K , whenever K is maximally distinguishable and proper, so in particular when K is maximally separable. One can think of this iteration as traversing the tree from the root to all of its leaves. At each stage, one considers a set of nodes and their corresponding not-downset formulae.
Step-by-step we replace a node by its immediate successors, if it has any. Throughout this process, the admissible approximation of the disjunction of these formulae remains invariant.
In Lemma 14, we show sufficient conditions for maintaining this invariant. Theorem 8 provides the evidence needed to show that when the computation ends one is left with an admissible approximation. Finally, all of this is put together in Theorem 9. It might be helpful to remark that Lemma 14 and Theorem 9 play roles similar to those of Lemma 17 and Theorem 3 of Goudsmit and Iemhoff (2014) .
We should note that, in order to apply Theorem 5, our eventual end-goal, it will not be necessary to know that this computation actually delivers an admissible approximation. Indeed, it suffices to merely know that nd m K can be admissibly transformed into a disjunctive-negative formula. We do prove this stronger fact to stress the connection between the proof technique as employed by Skura (1989, Theorem 2) and methods commonly used in the study of admissibility. In the following, we write ⊢ L,Dn to mean (⊢ L ) Dn .
Lemma
Let n be a natural number, and let L be an intermediate logic with the finite model property. Take W ⊆ U L (X) to be an anti-chain with 1 ̸ = |W | ≤ n such that Th (W )∩X = ∅, and let k ∈ U L (X) be such that W κ k. It follows that
Proof Before we proceed, first recall that by Lemma 10 we have
The second statement trivially follows from this observation. We now focus on the former statement. Let us first apply the above equivalence and unfold the definition of up (−).
The desired now follows from the computations below.
The first line is due to the assumed equivalence and the second is an immediate application of D − n . Finally, see that for each v ∈ W we have
Through Corollary 1, we now know the last inference to be valid as well, which finishes the proof. ■
To prove Theorem 8, we introduce some additional terminology and results from the literature. 13 We say that a formula ϕ is L-projective whenever there is a substitution σ such that ⊢ L σ(ϕ) and for all formulae ψ we have ϕ ⊢ L σ(ψ) ≡ ψ. The subsequent theorem is a reformulation of the original characterisation of projective formulae due to Ghilardi (1999) , here given in the context of the universal model.
Theorem (Ghilardi, 1999)
Let L be an intermediate logic with the finite model property. A formula ϕ ∈ L(X) is L-projective precisely if there is a k ∈ U L (X) with k ⊩ ϕ and for all anti-chains W ⊆ U L (X) with W ⊩ ϕ we have a l ⊩ ϕ with W κ l whenever there is a k ∈ U L (X) with W κ k.
Theorem
Let L be an intermediate logic with the finite model property, let X be a finite set, and let W ⊆ U L (X) be an upset. The following are equivalent.
Proof Suppose (2) holds, and let k ∈ W be such that W κ k. We proceed through Theorem 7. By assumption, we know of a
Let V ⊆ U L (X) be such that V ⊩ nd k, and assume that there is a l ∈ U L (X) with V κ l. If l ∈ V then we are done, so assume the contrary. To prove the desired, we seek a l ′ ∈ U L (X) with
In the latter case, we know w ≤ l ≤ k for some w ∈ W , so this case never occurs.
Assuming k = l we compute
and so V = V − {l} = W − {k} = W . By assumption, we know of a k ′ ̸ = k such that W κ k ′ , hence V κ k ′ . Now take k ′ = l ′ and we have proven (1).
To prove the converse, we reason by contraposition, so assume the negation of (2). This means that W can have either no covers at all, or a unique one. In the former case, the desired is vacuously true, so suppose there is but one unique k ∈ U L (X) such that W κ k. Clearly, W ⊩ nd k because if w ∈ W were such that w ̸ ⊩ nd k then w ≤ k, and as k ≤ w this entails k ∈ W , a contradiction. But if l ∈ U L (X) is such that W κ l, then l = k holds by assumption, hence l ⊩ nd k can never hold. Through Theorem 7, this proves the negation of (1). ■ Before we can state the following theorem we need two additional definitions.
Definition (Branching)
Let K be a partial order. The branching degree of an element k ∈ K is its number of immediate successors. We say K is at most n-fold branching when the branching degree of all k ∈ K is bounded by n.
In Theorem 9 below we prove that, for any finite rooted maximally separated models K, the admissible approximation of its not-down formula equals the disjunction of the not-down formulae of its maximal nodes. This can be readily seen when one instantiates ∆ by nd K and ∨ { nd m m ∈ max(K) } , making (10) and (11) true. Note that we take special care to keep track of the rules we use in this argument.
Theorem
Let n be a natural number, and let L be an intermediate logic with the finite model property that admits D n . Let K be a rooted finite maximally separable partial order, and endow it with the valuation m K . Assume that K is at most n-fold branching. The following are equivalent, for all finite set of formulae formulae ∆.
Proof We claim that the following holds for all k ∈ K.
Assume that the claim holds. It is easy to see that (12) entails (10), because ⊢ L,Dn is contained in L . We also note that (11) and the first conjunct of (13) immediately yield (12). Now suppose that (10) holds. The second conjunct of (13) leads to the following, bearing in mind
Due to Theorem 8, we know that for each m ∈ max(K) the formula nd m is L-projective. Fix a m ∈ max(K) and know that we have, due to the projectivity of nd m, a substitution σ m such that
by the above. By the second property of σ m , it now follows that nd m ⊢ L χ. Through transitivity, we thus obtain the following.
Combining this with the first conjunct of (10) we get (11), as desired.
Let us now prove the claim (13) by well-founded induction along the order in K for all k ∈ K. Write W for the set of immediate successors of k ∈ K. If W is empty, then there is nothing left to prove, so assume the contrary.
We compute as below. The first line makes use of Lemma 14, and the second holds by induction and transitivity. The third line follows mainly from transitivity of consequence relations, keeping in mind that max(k ↑) = ∪ w∈W max(w ↑). The subsequent three lines follow for analogous reasons in the reversed order.
4 Refutation for T n Gabbay and de Jongh (1974) introduced an infinite series of finitely axiomatizable intermediate logics with both the disjunction property and finite model property, now known as the Gabbay-de Jongh logics, given in Definition 14 below. 14 Per natural number n, one can consider the intermediate logic complete with respect to finite trees with branching of degree at most n. This is the (n − 1) th Gabbay-de Jongh logic. Chagrov and Zakharyaschev (1997) call this logic T n , and we will refer to it as such from now on. An axiomatization of this logic is given below, immediately followed by a characterization of the concrete models of this logic.
Definition
The logic of bounded branching until the n th degree, T n , is given as the intermediate logic
14 As attested to by Segerberg (1973) , this result was already known and published in a technical report in 1969.
The following series of results are meant to describe the structure of concrete models of T n . In Lemma 15, we, roughly speaking, describe models of T n as those models where only anti-chains of size at most n can cover an element. 15 Lemma (Goudsmit, 2013b, Lemma 12) Let K be a concrete and image-finite model K model. Now K is a model of T n precisely if for each anti-chain W ⊆ K and each k ∈ K we have |W | ≤ n whenever W κ k.
Corollary
A concrete and image-finite model whose underlying partial order is a tree is a model of T n precisely if it is at most n-fold branching.
For each set of variables X the universal model U Tn (X) is strongly n-ary covered. In particular, D m is admissible for each m ≤ n.
Proof The first statement is immediate from the observation that every anti-chain in the universal model covers something, and Lemma 15. The second statement follows from the first through Corollary 2. ■
The remainder of this section will be used to argue that the refutation system as given in Theorem 11 is both sound and complete. The system given there is the refutation system determined by {⊥} and D n . We prove sound-and completeness by means of the machinery developed in Section 3. In short, we will show that T n admissibly reduces to the set of CPC non-derivable formulae through D n .
Lemma
For each natural n ≥ 2, the logic T n is sound and complete with respect to proper at most n-fold branching finite trees. Moreover, each of these trees is maximally separable.
Proof Soundness is immediate through Corollary 5. Let us now argue for completeness. Take ϕ to be a formula such that T n ̸ ⊢ ϕ. By Gabbay and de Jongh (1974, Equation 34 ) we obtain a finite and at most n-fold branching tree such that T ̸ ⊩ ϕ. Without loss of generality we may assume that T is indeed proper, taking care to note that n ≥ 2. The final statement is immediate from Lemma 8. ■
Theorem
For any n ≥ 2, the intermediate logic T n is admissibly reducible to the set formulae that are non-derivable in CPC through all instances of D n and derivability in IPC.
Proof Suppose that ϕ is such that ̸ ⊢ Tn ϕ. Then there is a maximally separable model K ⊩ T n of branching degree at most n such that K ̸ ⊩ ϕ by Lemma 16. From Lemma 5 we get a substitution such that σ(ϕ) ⊢ IPC nd K. Through Theorem 9 we know the following.
We combine the above two observations into:
Finally, we remark that ⊢ IPC,Dn is included in Tn via Corollary 6. ■
The following two theorems are our main results. Note that, due to Remark 1, we may replace RD n with the basis of T n as described by Goudsmit and Iemhoff (2014) . This too would yield a structural refutation system, yet its formulation would be more cumbersome. 
For any n ≥ 2 the refutation system below is sound and complete for the intermediate logic T n . In particular, T n is Ł-decidable.
Proof This is a consequence of Theorem 10, Theorem 5, and Lemma 2, bearing Remark 1 in mind. ■
For any n ≥ 2 the intermediate logic T n is the greatest intermediate logic that admits D n .
Proof Let L be an intermediate logic that is greater than T n which admits D n . There must be some ϕ such that L ⊢ ϕ yet T n ̸ ⊢ ϕ. By Theorem 11 we know ⊣ ϕ. Now remark that this refutation system is sound for L too, yielding ̸ ⊢ L ϕ, a contradiction. ■
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